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Abstract
Recent years have seen a major expansion of the position of neuroscience 
in the mass media, public policy, and legal dialogue. Drawing on interviews 
with 48 London residents, this article examines how people with no prior 
involvement with neuroscience make sense of the concept of “brain research.” 
Thematic analysis of the data furnished little evidence that neuroscience has 
meaningfully infiltrated lay thinking. Respondents consigned brain knowledge 
to the “other world” of science, which was seen as a decidedly separate 
social milieu. They envisioned that the only route by which they might 
become alert to brain information would be if they developed a neurological 
illness. This article considers the social and psychological dynamics that 
shape neuroscience’s dissipation into public consciousness.
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Introduction
The early years of the 21st century were distinguished by an intensifica-
tion of the public prominence of neuroscientific ideas, which became 
favored points of reference within popular media as well as applied fields 
such as education, law, economics, and public policy. Although the poten-
tial social implications of this cultural trend have been widely discussed, 
little empirical research has investigated how lay publics have engaged 
with this influx of neuroscientific information. This article seeks to 
redress this gap, reporting the results of an interview study examining the 
social representations of brain research that have consolidated among the 
British public.
The Rise of Neuroscience
The designation of the 1990s as the “Decade of the Brain” precipitated a 
major expansion of the neurosciences, both in the volume of research 
produced and in the epistemic authority it commanded. As neuroscience’s 
scientific standing rose, so did its public profile: studies confirm that 
media coverage of brain research has increased dramatically in recent 
years (O’Connor, Rees, & Joffe, 2012; Racine, Waldman, Rosenberg, & 
Illes, 2010). This media content spans a diverse array of subjects, from 
advice on improving neurocognitive function to explanations of psycho-
social phenomena such as personality, sexuality and morality, and appli-
cations to educational, familial, economic and legal contexts. 
Neuroscience’s currency in today’s public sphere is thus both strong and 
wide-reaching.
The increasing public prominence of neuroscience has elicited much 
attention from sociologists, anthropologists, and cultural commentators, 
many of whom frame it as a profound cultural shift. These scholars argue 
that we are entering a “neuro age” in which contemporary neuroscience is 
inciting radical revisions of commonsense understandings of behavior, per-
sonhood, and society. Traditional conceptions of the autonomous, free-
thinking individual are positioned as under threat by the specters of 
“neurochemical selves” (Rose, 2007), “cerebral subjects” (Ortega, 2009) 
and “brainhood” (Vidal, 2009). While the prospect of brain-based identities 
invites divergent responses, enthusiasts and critics of these developments 
converge in painting neuroscience as a uniquely significant force in con-
temporary public consciousness.
Claims for the revolutionary import of neuroscience, however, are often 
rather speculative, rarely invoking empirical evidence that documents the 
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social and psychological repercussions of neuroscientific ideas (O’Connor 
& Joffe, 2013). An empirically grounded perspective on these develop-
ments is crucial, as it cannot be assumed that neuroscience filters into 
public consciousness in linear, predictable ways. Scientific ideas that reach 
the public sphere encounter active audiences who reconstruct information 
according to preexisting worldviews, identities, and agendas (Joffe & 
Haarhoff, 2002; Littlejohn & Foss, 2010). While analysis of media content 
elucidates how scientific ideas move from the laboratory to the public 
sphere, it cannot reveal how the material is taken up by lay audiences. 
Direct research with members of the public is necessary to illuminate how 
the neuroscientific ideas aired in the media resonate within naturalistic 
thought and conversation.
Neuroscience in Public Consciousness
While research investigating lay uptake of neuroscientific ideas has been 
slow to accumulate, the research that does exist casts doubt on claims of 
neuroscience’s transformative social effects. Two recent studies propose 
that despite neuroscience’s prominence in the media, members of the 
public are largely indifferent to brain research. In Pickersgill, 
Cunningham-Burley, and Martin’s (2011) focus groups involving both 
scientists and laypeople, while participants declared interest in neurosci-
ence, few employed neuroscientific ideas to understand their day-to-day 
experiences. Pickersgill et al. characterize the brain as an object of 
“mundane significance”: something that is recognized as objectively 
important but which remains remote from everyday life. Choudhury, 
McKinney, and Merten (2012) identify a similar duality in their focus 
groups with adolescents, who deemed research on the “teen brain” 
abstractly important, but irrelevant to their self-understanding. These 
studies undermine the contention that neuroscientific concepts have per-
vasively infiltrated commonsense thinking.
However, research with clinical populations reveals a different picture 
of lay engagement with neuroscience. For those diagnosed with psycho-
logical disorders such as depression or attention deficit hyperactivity disor-
der, neuroscience can provide a compelling framework for self-understanding 
(Buchman, Borgelt, Whiteley, & Illes, 2013; Singh, 2013a). Neuroscientific 
explanations are welcomed by many mentally unwell individuals, often as 
a means of validating the “reality” of their disorder. Importantly, however, 
when these neuroscientific understandings of disorders consolidate, they do 
not operate in an exclusive, absolute manner. Rather, for these populations 
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neurobiological explanations form just one facet of multidimensional mod-
els of disorders that integrate numerous causal factors (Buchman et al., 
2013; Bröer & Heerings, 2013; Meurk, Carter, Hall, & Lucke, 2014). 
Neuroscientific explanations are used flexibly and instrumentally, selec-
tively marshaled when they serve social- and self-identity needs (Singh, 
2013a).
The disparities between clinical and nonclinical populations may 
imply that personal engagement with brain science is contingent on direct 
experience of brain disorder. This accords with the work of Leder (1990), 
who characterizes the phenomenology of embodiment in terms of two 
processes: “disappearance” and “dys-appearance.” Leder (1990) argues 
that the essential marker of a healthy body is its inconspicuousness. As 
attention is directed into the world, the body itself fades from one’s per-
ceptual field: it “disappears” from conscious awareness. Leder declares 
that disappearance is particularly pertinent to one’s internal organs, which 
have limited sensory receptors and cannot be observed by any other sen-
sory modality. As such, organs like the brain do not ordinarily surface as 
focal objects of contemplation. Leder suggests that the primary means by 
which this oblivion to the body is ruptured is the experience of pain, dis-
comfort, or disease. The ordinary disappearance of the body is therein 
replaced by the body’s “dys-appearance,” which Leder defines as the sur-
facing of the body as the focus of attention but in a “dys” state. Therefore, 
when the body does breach awareness, it is as a source of threat, suffer-
ing, and constraint.
Existing research thus intimates that brain information is ordinarily 
absent from day-to-day consciousness, but this can be altered by experienc-
ing neuropathology. However, firm conclusions regarding the role of neuro-
science in lay society remain elusive, as most existing research focuses on 
groups deemed a priori to have a particular investment in neuroscience, usu-
ally via clinical diagnosis. The Choudhury et al. (2012) and Pickersgill et al. 
(2011) studies are notable exceptions; however, the former concentrated 
specifically on eight adolescents’ responses to the idea of a teen brain, while 
Pickersgill et al.’s (2011) sample was composed of neuroscientists, patients, 
or members of professions the researchers saw as relevant to brain research. 
Such samples represent what Michael (2009) terms publics-in-particular, 
that is, populations who have “an identifiable stake in particular scientific or 
technological issues” (p. 623), as opposed to the more undifferentiated pub-
lic-in-general. The latter model is often criticized for unduly reifying “the 
public” as a monolithic entity, obscuring the heterogeneity of its component 
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individuals and groups. It remains important, however, to understand how 
brain science is construed by those without a predefined stake in neurosci-
ence research, given that this position likely reflects the vast majority of the 
general population. While noninvested individuals are unlikely to maintain 
structured bodies of factual knowledge about contemporary neuroscience, 
the spontaneous, intuitive meanings they draw from neuroscientific ideas 
illuminate the pathways along which neuroscientific concepts assimilate 
into a culture, and therefore merit empirical attention. The current research 
sought to elucidate this everyday “sense making” through a series of inter-
views in which lay Britons articulated their immediate associations with the 
concept of brain research.
Theoretical and Methodological Approach
Theoretically, the interview study is guided by the social psychological frame-
work of social representations theory (SRT). The concept of social representa-
tion refers to the network of ideas and values that constitute a “lay theory” 
about a given topic. While SRT research investigates a diverse range of social, 
political, and economic phenomena, traditionally a key objective has been to 
theorize the position occupied by scientific information in everyday social life. 
Moscovici (1961/2008), the founder of SRT, argues that a distinguishing fea-
ture of modern society is the reliance of common sense on ideas emanating 
from science, rather than religious or political dictum. Successive SRT theorists 
have reiterated the centrality of science in contemporary society, contending 
that as the political agenda becomes increasingly preoccupied with technosci-
entific issues (e.g., climate change, Internet security, bioengineering), ordinary 
citizens are motivated to develop a “vernacular science knowledge” that facili-
tates participation in public debates (Wagner, 2007).
SRT holds that vernacular science knowledge does not simply repro-
duce scientific expertise, as it is woven into prevailing networks of cul-
tural values, identities, and beliefs. New scientific information 
accommodates into familiar cultural meanings via two processes: anchor-
ing and objectification. Anchoring is an act of classification that locates 
an unfamiliar phenomenon relative to a culture’s established repertoire of 
categories, while objectification refers to the concretization of the novel 
phenomenon with tangible symbols, images, and metaphors. For exam-
ple, in the 1990s genetic engineering was anchored in the notion of “clon-
ing” and objectified in the figure of “Dolly the sheep” (Bauer & Gaskell, 
1999). The anchors and objectifications drawn from established cultural 
repertoires invariably carry social, emotional, and conative associations, 
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which are projected onto the new phenomenon. Anchoring and objectifi-
cation therefore guide how people orient to new ideas. For instance, Smith 
and Joffe (2009) show how the media imagery that objectifies climate 
change, such as polar bears stranded on melting ice or “freak” local flood-
ing, positions climate change as either distant or close in temporal, physi-
cal, and social space, thereby modulating the extent of personal 
engagement with the issue.
Epistemologically, SRT represents a form of “weak” social construction-
ism: it accepts the existence of an external reality but posits that people’s 
access to that reality is always mediated by cultural categories and values. 
In counterpoint to the “deficit model” of public understanding of science 
(Irwin & Wynne, 1996), SRT analyzes knowledge not in terms of its cor-
respondence with a universally “correct” logic but in terms of its social 
psychological significance for the communities that produce it. It posits 
that in digesting scientific information, people’s primary concern is not 
with veridically accessing “brute reality” but in constructing a representa-
tion of the world that satisfies social, emotional, and pragmatic imperatives 
(Jovchelovitch, 2008).
A concern with capturing this bottom-up process of knowledge con-
struction informed the design of the present study, which rejected prede-
termined interview schedules in favor of an open structure that was 
optimally receptive to unique or unexpected ideas. The research adopted 
the free association Grid Elaboration Method (GEM), an interview tech-
nique that has illuminated social representations of a range of scientific 
and health phenomena (Joffe, 2012; Joffe & Elsey, in press). This method 
reconstitutes free association, a technique historically associated with 
psychoanalytic clinical practice, into a research tool. The progression of 
the interview is dictated by the flow of associations that the respondent 
spontaneously produces in response to the topic of interest, with minimal 
intercession by the interviewer. As the data elicited are entirely partici-
pant generated, it facilitates a glimpse into how people mobilize their 
naturalistic chains of association in apprehending a given topic. In assum-
ing this approach, the research sought to provide a rich and ecologically 
valid account of how laypeople make sense of the topic of brain research.
Method
Sample Recruitment and Composition
This research took place in the United Kingdom, which is one of the 
world’s major producers of neuroscience research (Wellcome Trust, 2011) 
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and whose national media afford considerable attention to neuroscientific 
ideas (O’Connor et al., 2012). Data consisted of interviews with 48 indi-
viduals living in greater London. A research recruitment company was 
contracted to secure a demographically stratified sample according to the 
criteria in Figure 1. Newspaper readership formed one selection criterion, 
with half of participants ordinarily reading tabloids and half identifying as 
broadsheet readers. This provided insight into participants’ most likely 
sites of contact with neuroscientific information and also ensured that the 
sample was socioeconomically diverse, since in the United Kingdom 
broadsheets are associated with higher and tabloids with lower socioeco-
nomic readerships (Chan & Goldthorpe, 2007). The sample was also bal-
anced according to age and gender. No participant had formal education in 
neuroscience or psychology.
Interview procedure
Ethical approval was granted by University College London. Interviews took 
place in central London between May and October 2012. Participants were 
not told the topic of the research before their interview.
In accordance with the GEM technique, interviews began by giving par-
ticipants a grid of four empty boxes and asking them to write or draw the first 
four ideas that came to mind on hearing the term brain research.1 Figure 2 
displays an example of a completed grid.
Total sample (N=48)
Tabloid reader (n=24)
Male (n=12)
Age 
18-37 
(n=4)
Age 
38-57 
(n=4)
Age 
58-77 
(n=4)
Female (n=12)
Age 
18-37 
(n=4)
Age 
38-57 
(n=4)
Age 
58-77 
(n=4)
Broadsheet reader (n=24)
Male (n=12)
Age 
18-37 
(n=4)
Age 
38-57 
(n=4)
Age 
58-77 
(n=4)
Female (n=12)
Age 
18-37 
(n=4)
Age 
38-57 
(n=4)
Age 
58-77 
(n=4)
Figure 1. Sample composition.
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The subsequent verbal interview was structured around the responses to 
this task, with participants asked to expand on the ideas they had introduced 
in each box. The interviewer encouraged further elaboration through general 
prompt questions (e.g., “Could you tell me more about that?”). To help elicit 
concrete examples of previous encounters with neuroscience, towards the 
Figure 2. Example of completed free association grid.
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end of the interview respondents were also asked whether they had ever come 
across information about brain research in the media.
Some trepidation was common at the beginning of the interviews, with 
certain respondents feeling ill-equipped to speak about the topic. To mini-
mize the inhibition associated with speaking about an “expert” field, respon-
dents were informed that there were no correct or incorrect answers and that 
as the interviewer was not a neuroscience expert, she would not know whether 
respondents’ impressions were scientifically accurate. This promoted a more 
relaxed, informal atmosphere.
Interviews lasted between 18 and 54 minutes, with an average duration 
of 34 minutes. On finishing, respondents were debriefed and received a 
modest payment for participation. Audio recordings of all interviews were 
transcribed and imported into the ATLAS.ti software package for 
analysis.
Data Analysis
Interview data were analyzed via thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 
2006; Joffe, 2012). Transcripts were inspected to detect salient concepts 
and patterns, which were gradually incorporated into a coding frame that 
captured the key features of the textual material. Code development 
involved both inductive and deductive strategies, so that the coding frame 
was informed by existing literature as well as responsive to unexpected 
emerging patterns. To establish the coding frame’s reliability, two 
researchers independently applied it to the same four interviews. Their 
coding patterns were compared, and the coding frame was revised on this 
basis. Once the coding frame was finalized, the two coders applied it to an 
additional 12 interviews. Comparing their coding with Cohen’s kappa 
analyses yielded an average reliability value of .6, indicating “substan-
tial” agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977).
When all transcripts were fully coded, a frequency table was produced 
indicating the proportion of interviews in which each code appeared. This 
revealed the patterns that traversed the data set. To broaden the analytic 
focus to the level of themes, ATLAS.ti’s query tool was used to identify 
codes that were linked in the data—for example, pairs of codes that fre-
quently co-occurred or followed each other. Additionally, the substantive 
content of each code (i.e., its corresponding quotations) was examined to 
distinguish conceptual links between codes. These interrogations of the 
data unearthed particular networks of codes that clustered together to form 
themes.
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Results
Four themes were identified in the data. Engagement with brain research was 
premised on representations of the brain as (1) a domain of science, (2) some-
thing that goes wrong, (3) a resource subject to individual control, and (4) a 
source of human variation.2 The key features of all themes are summarized in 
Table 1. It is important to note that themes did not materialize in an exclusive, 
either/or manner: most interviewees drew on multiple themes, which slipped 
in and out of focus as discussion evolved.
Since this article is primarily concerned with exploring the immediate, spon-
taneous processes by which respondents made sense of brain research, it will 
focus on the first two themes. In terms of typical interview sequence, these 
tended to dominate the early stages of the interviews, capturing respondents’ 
attempts to define the concept of brain research and orient themselves toward it. 
Table 1. Summary of Key Features of Themes.
1.  The brain is a domain of science
  • Nominal expression of interest (88%) but not personally salient (71%)
  •  Anchored in science: objectified in scientific instruments (46%), images of 
scientists (33%), classrooms (19%), animal research (25%)
  •  Distance from science (42%) feeds both hostility (31%) and admiration (25%)
2.  The brain is something that goes wrong
  •  Brain strongly associated with pathology (98%): both neurological (92%) and 
psychological (60%)
  • Brain research anchored in medicine (60%) and surgery (63%)
  •  Dys-appearance: attention to brain/neuroscience contingent on experience 
of neuropathology (25%)
3.  The brain is a resource subject to individual control
  •  Suggestion that neurocognitive capacity can be altered by individual lifestyle 
choices (83%)
  • Desire to improve brain function (44%)
  • Belief that only a minority of the brain is used (29%)
4.  The brain is a source of human variation
  •  Interindividual variation (54%) and own individuality (38%) attributed to 
brain
  •  Neurobiological attributions occur alongside environmental attributions 
(52%)
  •  Brain explanations strongest for abnormal or threatening abilities/
behavior—e.g., criminality (33%), genius (21%)
Note: Percentage figures indicate the proportion of interviews in which the relevant code 
occurred.
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The latter two themes emerged upon more extended reflection on brain research, 
which for most participants was a novel exercise. As such, the immediate asso-
ciations detailed by the first two themes offer more direct insight into neurosci-
ence’s resonance in participants’ “gut” or default patterns of representation.
Theme 1: The Brain Is a Domain of Science
The first theme presents the finding that although respondents described 
brain research as interesting, it occupied a negligible space in their day-to-
day thought and conversation. With brain research absent from their own 
experience, participants strove to categorize it within the social arena. A vari-
ety of anchoring and objectification processes funneled the brain into the 
domain of science, which was positioned as a sharply separate “other world.” 
This theme outlines participants’ representations of this scientific sphere and 
charts the ways in which respondents oriented themselves to the other world 
of science.
The Brain in Everyday Life: Interesting but Inconspicuous. The most prevalent 
single code in the data, materializing in 42 (88%) interviews, was a professed 
interest in brain-related ideas. Though this prevalence may suggest that neu-
roscientific issues appealed to people’s imaginations, these expressions of 
interest should be understood in light of the interviews’ interpersonal context, 
wherein respondents may have wished to affirm the conversational agenda 
set by the researcher. Most expressions of interest amounted to rather super-
ficial, offhand statements that brain research was “quite interesting.” This 
evidently did not reflect an enduring preoccupation with brain research 
beyond the interview context: for many, discussing brain research was an 
entirely novel experience. Most respondents (n = 34; 71%) took pains to con-
vey that neuroscience was not salient in their day-to-day life: it was “just not 
really on my radar.”
Science of the brain? I haven’t a clue. Nothing at all. I’d be lying if I said there 
was. You know, I’ve been a bus driver for many years, I was a salesman for 
many many years and I don’t know, it’s, it’s, I mean I’ve never, ever, ever given 
it a thought. (Male, tabloid reader, 38-57 age-group)
Participants often attributed their unawareness of brain research to its low 
profile in wider society. They generally did not see brain research as promi-
nent in the media. Almost twice as many respondents asserted that they never 
or rarely encountered it in the media (n = 27; 56%) than described media 
coverage as occasional or regular (n = 15; 31%). The 15 who acknowledged 
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media coverage of neuroscience had not intensively engaged with it: they 
described media coverage in vague terms and struggled to recall concrete 
examples of stories they had encountered. Neuroscience information was 
quickly forgotten: as one respondent put it, “It’s something you might occa-
sionally read an article about and say, gosh, that’s interesting, and then turn 
over the page.”
Brain awareness was therefore not “forced” on participants by encountering 
neuroscientific information in the external world, and neither did it spring from 
subjective experience of their own body. People repeatedly referred to the auto-
matic, unconscious nature of the brain’s operations (n = 15; 31%). Because 
neurobiological processes “just happen,” conscious reflection on brain function 
was seen as unnecessary. Indeed, some participants portrayed explicit contem-
plation of the brain’s operations as cognitively or existentially uncomfortable, 
provoking a sense of strangeness that “hurts my head” and “clutters” immedi-
ate task performance. Respondents did not see their self-proclaimed ignorance 
of what was happening “inside them” as problematic, and in everyday life they 
were rarely troubled by the gaps in their understanding.
Anchoring and Objectification: Funneling the Brain Toward “Science.” The unfamil-
iarity of the neuroscience field brought anchoring and objectification processes 
to the fore. With brain research absent from participants’ local realities, an 
immediate task when confronted with the concept was to categorize the sphere 
of life to which it belonged. For many, the word brain immediately evoked the 
more general concept of science.
That train of thought came through just the word “brain” as well, you know. It’s 
really scientific, our brains, you know. And how they work and . . . what else? 
Yeah, automatically I would just think the word “science” really. (Female, 
broadsheet reader, 18-37 age-group)
While the association of brain research with science is rather self-evident, 
what is interesting is not the association in itself but how the anchoring of 
brain in science shaped people’s assumptions about what brain research 
entailed. First, the categorization of brain as “science” reminded people of 
the science education they had experienced in school. Nine (19%) people 
explicitly attributed their understandings of the brain to the classroom, and 
many more (n = 35; 73%) conceptualized the brain in terms of “textbook” 
facts (e.g., its connection to the spinal cord) that likely originated in school 
science lessons. For certain people, formal education had been the primary or 
sole means of contact with the scientific domain, and this formed their under-
standing of what science is and does.
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When I first hear like “science” I always go back to school, and like in science 
lessons with the test tubes and everything like that. So it’s just a bit, I’m not too 
sure in like what science really, really is if you get what I mean. Because I’ve 
always gone back to like the picture in my head of like test tubes and my 
science teacher and things, Bunsen burners and all that stuff. (Female, 
broadsheet reader, 18-37 age-group)
The anchoring of brain research in science also aroused ideas of research on 
animal subjects, mentioned by one quarter of participants (n = 12; 25%). This 
concept was presented in quite visual terms, with several describing images 
of rats or monkeys in technological contraptions. This was how participants 
pictured the quotidian of brain research.
Brain research I understand, an image of, I don’t know, a monkey or a dog with 
like the top of their head off and electrodes and stuff on their brain. (Male, 
broadsheet reader, 18-37 age-group)
The image of “electrodes” in the above quote is emblematic of a widespread 
objectification of neuroscience in imagery of research instruments, which 
materialized in almost half of interviews (n = 22; 46%). Often these were 
stereotypical features of science classrooms, such as Bunsen burners and bea-
kers. Other instruments mentioned included scalpels, microscopes, and “hel-
mets” that encased the skull. Seven (15%) participants explicitly named the 
technology of fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging), with a further 
nine (19%) referring to a more generic “brain scan.” The “scientific,” techni-
cal nature of such instruments held a truth value for some participants, con-
noting an objective, accurate depiction of the subject.
If he’s working with people that are doing it in a scientific way, however that’s 
done, you know in labs or something or using, using equipment and probably 
have things strapped to people’s arms or brains or something, so you would 
think it’s got some element of truth to it. (Female, broadsheet reader, 38-57 
age-group)
The other salient objectification, materializing in one third of interviews, was 
a very formulaic visual image of the person of the scientist (n = 16; 33%). 
This image hinged on the core element of a white lab coat, with the coated 
individual usually situated in a laboratory, surrounded by instruments and 
machinery. The figure was almost invariably male and was sometimes per-
sonified by well-known scientific characters such as Einstein or “the Weetos 
guy” (the bespectacled elderly professor who advertises breakfast cereal).
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It does conjure up images of, you know, strange men in white coats (Female, 
broadsheet reader, 38-57 age-group)
Thus, the categorization of brain research as “science” elicited a range of 
associations involving school, animal research, and scientific imagery. 
Through processes of anchoring and objectification, these emblems of sci-
ence were transposed onto representations of brain research.
The Positioning of Self in Relation to Science. The classification of brain-related 
topics, actors, or activities as science meant that participants’ established atti-
tudes to science molded their emerging orientations to brain research. The 
most dominant mode of relating to science—and thus to neuroscience—was 
dissociation. “Science” was positioned as a decidedly separate social milieu 
in which there was no question of self-participation. The designation of a 
stimulus as scientific elicited an immediate, patterned response of disengage-
ment from the object in question.
I might have seen it on the news or something, you know, some report of some 
description. But because they probably mentioned the word “science,” or 
“We’re going to go now to our science correspondent Mr. Lala,” that’s probably 
when I go, okay, it’s time for me to make a cup of tea. (Male, tabloid reader, 
38-57 age-group)
Feelings of alienation were explicitly expressed by 20 (42%) participants, 
revealing a sharp us-them divide between lay and scientific populations. 
For much of the sample, the domain of science was incontrovertibly “other,” 
involving an entirely unfamiliar and “completely alien” set of understand-
ings, aims, and abilities.
There’s these guys going off and doing this stuff and they understand it but we 
don’t understand it so much. [. . .] from tabloid newspapers in particular that 
you’d have words like “boffins” being used. And that sort of thing makes 
people think, woah, other people. (Male, tabloid reader, 18-37 age-group)
Identity dynamics were therefore strongly implicated in (dis)engagement 
with brain research. The ability or inclination to engage with brain knowl-
edge was seen to hinge on what “type” of person one was—namely, whether 
one was “scientific” and “academic.” Respondents avoided brain information 
because they self-identified as nonscientific, thereby designating the brain 
beyond their sphere of relevance, interest, and competence.
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I can’t say that I really look at it very closely, because as I said, you know, I’m 
not a very scientific person. (Male, broadsheet reader, 58-77 age-group)
The separation of self from science was underpinned by acute sensitivity to 
differentials in knowledge. Self-proclamations of ignorance occurred in 81% 
of interviews (n = 39), on average three times in each interview. People 
repeatedly qualified their statements with reminders of their relative lack of 
knowledge, suggesting that this invalidated their perspective.
I don’t know if I’m right in saying that but I feel that. But you know it’s quite 
scary ‘cause I shouldn’t be saying that without even, without having studied it. 
[. . .] I’ve no right to say it in the sense that I say, well, I know that now because 
I have a BSc in blah blah blah. I, you know, I haven’t done any of that. I’m just 
from the university of life. (Female, broadsheet reader, 38-57 age-group)
Rather than a topic they could legitimately debate, the brain was the exclu-
sive preserve of an intellectual elite. The perceived complexity of the relevant 
knowledge precluded lay participation: unfamiliar, dense, and technical lan-
guage flagged scientific content as “not for me.” The confusion experienced 
on encountering inaccessible information was demoralizing and contributed 
toward a withdrawal from the scientific sphere.
You just, like I say, blind people with science, don’t you. And then it becomes 
a subject that you just don’t understand. With me, I just switch off. I’m not 
understanding what you’re talking about here, so I just switch off. (Male, 
tabloid reader, 38-57 age-group)
The sense of an informational gulf between self and science therefore had a 
mutually reinforcing relationship with a social gulf between self and science. 
Scientific information was seen as so complex that those who comprehended it 
must be an entirely different category of person. For instance, one woman 
asked incredulously, “Where do these people come from, that actually under-
stand these things?” implying that they could not “come from” the world she 
herself inhabited.
For certain participants, this estrangement fed resentment or fear of the 
scientific sphere. Fifteen (31%) people voiced suspicion about scientific activ-
ity, wary about financial or political agendas or the use of science to manipu-
late the public. However, it would be misleading to characterize this as the 
sole or dominant attitude toward science. The exalted position of science gave 
rise to homage as well as hostility, with one quarter of participants professing 
admiration for scientists. Employing vocabulary such as “extraordinary,” 
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“noble,” and “special,” descriptions of scientists were tinged with idealization 
and even deification.
Anything to do with the brain, anything to do with medical research, any sort of—
you literally are your life in their hands and you need the help and you, you expect 
them to be gods. You expect them to be able to do certain things. You do expect them 
to be, know more than you. Otherwise we’d all be doctors and scientists and 
engineers and you know, we’re not. (Female, broadsheet reader, 58-77 age-group)
The last two sentences of the above extract convey the principle that scien-
tists’ difference from the self could, for some people, function as an important 
foundation for trust. This participant believed that scientists could be trusted 
precisely because they are “more than you.” Several argued that scientists’ 
lengthy and stringent training regimes guaranteed their competence and dedi-
cation. Thus, in some interviews the distanced position of science functioned 
as a badge of credibility rather than cause for suspicion.
You trust them because it’s, is it like 11 years or something? It’s a long time so 
it kind of, it really stretches it out so the people who are doctors really are 
professional people, they know what they’re doing, you can trust these people. 
[. . .] I think with it being such a stringent process you’re kind of forced to trust 
them. (Male, tabloid reader, 18-37 age-group]
Thus, the widespread sense of estrangement from science showed a dual-
sided valence. While some expressed antipathy toward science, for others 
science’s distanced position fostered an image of admirable beings who con-
ducted work that outstripped the capacities of normal minds.
Theme 2: The Brain Is Something That Goes Wrong
Though the brain was ordinarily absent from participants’ mental landscapes, 
there was one route by which this habitual inattention could be ruptured. The 
second theme articulates the finding that for many, neurological pathology 
was the only aspect of brain research that held clear personal relevance. This 
foregrounding of pathology constituted the brain as a vulnerable, anxiety-
provoking organ and anchored brain research in the domain of medicine.
The Brain Is a Negatively Valenced Concept. When participants began to 
speak about the brain, many of their immediate associations revolved 
around its potential to malfunction. Pathology was a near-universally 
acknowledged feature of brain research, mentioned in all but one 
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interview (n = 47; 98%). As will be outlined shortly, both neurological 
and psychological forms of pathology were discussed, with the former 
attracting more attention.
Much content within this theme was grounded in respondents’ own life 
experiences, with 37 (77%) people referring to pathological conditions expe-
rienced by themselves or acquaintances. This personal experience of pathol-
ogy was the primary—and for some, the only—route by which they 
envisioned becoming mindful of brain knowledge. While allusions to this 
quality of “dys-appearance” appeared throughout most of the sample, one 
quarter of participants (n = 12; 25%) self-reflexively acknowledged the 
importance of illness in mediating awareness of the brain, explicitly stating 
that brain disease would be necessary to shock them into acknowledging the 
brain’s role in their lives.
Science of the brain is almost something that you find out about if there’s 
something wrong with you. You know. You might have a medical issue. So 
that’s when your GP might open up, you know, this chasm of information about 
the science of the brain and you’ve then got to try and understand it. (Male, 
tabloid reader, 38-57 age-group)
As the healthy, normally functioning brain did not ordinarily enter conscious 
awareness, when the brain was considered it was primarily a source of pain 
and debilitation. Representations of the brain were therefore heavily loaded 
toward the negative. For many, the word brain immediately evoked associa-
tions of illness and its unpleasant emotional connotations.
Not pleasant inference. More or less. Because it’s the brain. Then that’s a bit 
scary. [. . .] So, you know, just, just an initial thought. Thought oh, brains, 
hospital, no. (Female, broadsheet reader, 58-77 age-group)
Thus, the brain’s tendency to “dys-appear” resulted in a near-exclusive asso-
ciation of “brain” with pathology, which tainted the organ with an unpleasant 
emotional residue.
Anchoring and Objectification: Funneling the Brain Toward Medicine. Just as the 
brain was seen primarily as a locus of pathology, brain research was 
anchored in the medical domain. The association with medicine, formed 
by 29 (60%) people, was often immediate and spontaneous. Many con-
ceived of brain research as an intrinsically medical enterprise, which 
occurred in a hospital and was exclusively oriented toward disease or 
disability.
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Brain research is probably mostly like medical stuff to be honest. To my, in my 
opinion that’s what I think it is. Medication, medical things. (Female, tabloid 
reader, 18-37 age-group)
The interviews revealed a particularly striking conflation of the fields 
brain research and brain surgery, reference to which occurred in 30 (63%) 
interviews. Equally, the terms brain scientist or brain researcher were 
used interchangeably with brain surgeon or doctor. Numerous participants 
assumed that surgery would be the primary occupation of brain 
researchers.
I thought of brain surgery. As soon as you said brain research, I don’t know, I 
just thought of someone picking at a brain, like dissecting, figuring what parts 
are what. (Female, broadsheet reader, 18-37 age-group)
With this invocation of surgery, the unfamiliar domain of contemporary 
brain research was anchored in an old, accustomed field, whose character-
istics shaped participants’ developing conceptions of brain research. For 
instance, neurosurgery was generally described using vocabulary that indi-
cated a sense of violation (n = 16; 33%). This vocabulary transferred to 
conceptions of brain research, which was described as “digging at,” “tin-
kering with,” or “drilling into” the brain. Additionally, as much under-
standing of brain surgery derived from film portrayals, brain research was 
objectified in vivid, sometimes quite violent, images of surgical 
procedures.
I just saw, you know, doctors and then the person on the operating table and 
then just lights, and then yeah, digging at it. (Female, broadsheet reader, 18-37 
age-group)
Unease with external intervention in the brain was echoed in discussion of elec-
troconvulsive therapy, which was mentioned by six respondents (13%). Again, 
this was represented in terms of violation or intrusion, variously described as 
“messing,” “scrambling,” or “tinkering” with the person’s brain. Some partici-
pants described quite graphic images of people undergoing electroconvulsive 
therapy, which were again usually derived from television or film imagery.
It looked quite barbaric really, someone being strapped to, you know, to a 
hospital bed and just being given these shocks which will be quite painful. 
(Female, broadsheet reader, 38-57 years)
 at Maynooth University on November 24, 2015scx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
O’Connor and Joffe 635
Associations with medicine were not always specific to the brain: several inter-
views evolved into broader discussions of medical institutions, medical profes-
sionals, and general health. Cancer was a particularly salient touchstone, mentioned 
in 25 (52%) interviews. Cancer was the default illness relative to which neurologi-
cal pathology was appraised, and a “cure for cancer” formed a recurring trope 
throughout the interviews, exemplifying the rightful aim of scientific research.
Thus, representations of brain research absorbed elements of existing rep-
resentations of medicine, such as its physical location (hospital), practitioners 
(doctors), priorities (developing cures for cancer), and material practices 
(invasive surgery). The anxiety attached to these attributes colored people’s 
instinctive orientations to neuroscience.
What Can Go Wrong?  Forms of pathology introduced fell into two categories: 
neurological conditions, mentioned by 44 (92%) participants, and psychiatric/psy-
chological conditions, which appeared in 29 (60%) interviews. These two catego-
ries of pathology were discussed in discernibly different ways, as elaborated here.
Neurological conditions. The neurological conditions that most preoccu-
pied people were dementia (n = 24; 50%), cerebrovascular conditions such as 
stroke and aneurysm (n = 18; 38%), and brain cancer (n = 18; 38%). Demen-
tia, the most salient focus of concern, was repeatedly objectified in a narra-
tive of decline that had a rather formulaic structure, with its sufferers depicted 
as regressing to childhood. When describing acquaintances with dementia, 
respondents commonly volunteered information about the person’s prior life 
that served as evidence of their earlier vitality. This sharpened the sense of 
descent and intensified its poignancy.
I watched him deteriorate mentally as an old man and it was quite shocking to see 
a man of such intellectual prowess go down, go off completely mad, you know, it’s 
like, oh, that’s dementia for you. (Male, broadsheet reader, 38-57 age-group)
A sense of anxiety permeated discussions of neurological conditions. This 
fear intensified with age, with several of the older participants describing 
alarm at their occasional episodes of forgetfulness. Anxiety was com-
pounded by a sense that prevalence rates of dementia were increasing, and 
several respondents specifically noted its visible media presence. Much of 
participants’ fear of neurological disorder revolved around an anticipated 
loss of independence (n = 10; 21%). Loss of self-sufficiency was seen to 
dismantle personal dignity, with deterioration of brain function equated with 
disintegration of the self. Furthermore, reliance on others engendered vul-
nerability to manipulation.
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It is a fear of mine [. . .] Just not knowing what I’m doing, if someone would 
take advantage of me or something like as we spoke earlier, signing all my 
properties over to the nurse. (Male, broadsheet reader, 38-57 age-group)
Neurological disorder was also associated with the loss of important relation-
ships (n = 9; 19%). This particularly applied to memory deterioration and the 
specific fear of forgetting one’s children, which was imagined as an incon-
ceivable horror.
Thus, neurological disorder was not purely a matter of corporeal illness; it 
devoured a person’s independence, relationships, and identity. As a result, 
discussion of neurological disorders was tinged with sharp emotional reso-
nance of fear and dread.
Psychiatric and psychological conditions. The psychological disorders men-
tioned were mainly mood disorders (n = 14; 29%) and learning disorders (n = 
10; 21%), along with sporadic references to addiction (n = 7; 15%), autism 
or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (n = 6; 13%), schizophrenia (n = 6; 
13%), and personality disorders (n = 5; 10%). Notably, psychological disor-
der evoked little fear relative to neurological pathology. Many assumed that 
psychiatric disorder was unlikely to directly affect them, unlike neurological 
illness, which struck indiscriminately. Instead of fear, the dominant emotive 
response was sympathy toward those affected.
I feel sorry for schizophrenics as well. [. . .] because when your brain is in pain 
and you know that there’s something wrong with you, I think that must be quite 
difficult to live with. (Female, broadsheet reader, 58-77 age-group)
While sympathy reflected a benevolent stance, it did not necessarily move 
the sympathizer subjectively closer to mentally ill populations. Sympathy 
was often elicited precisely by the sense that these people were dramatically 
different from oneself. The emotional response was predicated on and per-
petuated this perception of difference, as demonstrated by a sense of awk-
wardness about one’s own relatively fortunate position.
I see them in the chairs being pushed along, they don’t even seem to connect. 
You know, what is going on in their little brains? Oh gosh, I feel embarrassed 
for myself, for my inability to be able to communicate with them. And normally 
I just smile, but, ‘cause what else can you do? (Female, broadsheet reader, 
58-77 age-group)
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Within the sample as a whole, psychiatric conditions were generally unprob-
lematically portrayed as neurobiological in nature, with six (13%) partici-
pants invoking the notion of “chemical imbalance.” Explicit reference to 
environmental factors in mental illness occurred in just six (13%) interviews. 
These six people did not, however, deny a biological foundation, instead por-
traying environmental and biological processes as parallel contributors.
Affirming the biological etiology of psychological dysfunction held par-
ticular import for five (10%) individuals who divulged direct experience of 
mental disorder. The very emotional narratives produced by these individuals 
revealed the distinctly personal meanings of brain ideas within contexts of 
psychological distress. Respondents described the time of diagnosis, when 
their difficulties were newly classified as brain disorder, as a critical transi-
tion point in their lives, which provoked sharp shifts in their self-understand-
ing. Its main effect was to remove their psychological tribulations from the 
self, reconstituting them as something that had happened to them rather than 
something they had caused.
I became severely depressed. But of course, as I didn’t know that the explanation 
was purely chemical, I took it as this is my life and these are my real feelings. 
[. . .] Well they were my real feelings, but they were chemically induced as 
opposed to a result of my life. They were a result of my body if you like. 
Affecting my brain, as in my chemistry. [. . .] But it [diagnosis] was like a light, 
somebody had pulled one of those lights in a bathroom, click click. Everything 
changed and history changed. (Male, broadsheet reader, 58-77 age-group)
These individuals were acutely aware of the contested nature of psychiatric 
illness and felt that defining it as neurological would legitimize it, safeguard-
ing their social status and access to services. However, despite this strong 
endorsement of a “brain disorder” understanding of mental illness, they also 
worried that indiscriminate assignment of the “brain disorder” label would 
dilute its authenticating power. Some attempted to “police the boundaries” of 
their diagnostic category by arbitrating between legitimate and illegitimate 
cases of psychiatric dysfunction. For example, one man expressed anger at 
“people who jump on this bandwagon and pretend that they’ve got a mental 
illness when they don’t, just ‘cause they don’t want to go to work,” feeling 
that this “ruins it for the rest of the people that genuinely, you know, cannot 
go to work.” The authenticating implications of a brain disorder classification 
were therefore not entirely secure: its boundaries required active policing to 
ensure that exemplars who could undermine its credibility were excluded.
A final point to note is that individuals with direct experience of psychiat-
ric dysfunction were more sensitized to brain ideas generally. Pathology 
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made the brain personally relevant and increased motivation to learn about it. 
People with psychiatric difficulties actively sought and earnestly endorsed 
the classification of “brain disorder,’ using it to internally represent and exter-
nally articulate their experience. In this sense, direct experience of mental 
health problems represented the primary context in the data in which neuro-
scientific ideas had meaningfully infiltrated self-perception and social 
relations.
Discussion
The most immediately striking feature of this study was the stark absence of 
neuroscientific concepts from ordinary repertoires of common sense. Most 
interviewees were oblivious to media coverage of neuroscience and strongly 
asserted that the brain did not surface as an object of thought or conversation 
in their daily lives. This substantiates previous research attesting to the 
remoteness of nonclinical neuroscience from ordinary subjectivities 
(Choudhury et al., 2012; Pickersgill et al., 2011). It seems that despite neuro-
science’s prominence within public institutions such as the mass media, con-
temporary brain research has yet to seriously penetrate the conceptual 
repertoires of lay citizens.
Typically, the opening stages of the interviews were characterized by brief 
periods of bafflement, as respondents registered the unfamiliar topic that con-
fronted them. Consistent with the tenets of SRT, the processes of anchoring 
and objectification were pivotal in enabling participants to break through this 
disorientation. Most respondents acted immediately to anchor brain research 
in established social categories, most prominently science and medicine. 
Respondents relied on these classifications to develop a conception of what 
brain research is and to orient themselves to it in social space. For instance, a 
representation of brain research as science was objectified in the figures of 
eccentric, white-coated men who tinkered with strange instruments in sterile 
laboratories. This constituted brain research as distant and “other.” Meanwhile, 
a representation of brain research as medicine was objectified in imagery of 
invasive, painful surgical procedures, which elicited a sense of violation and 
apprehension. Anchoring and objectification processes thereby enriched the 
initially obscure category of brain research with epistemic, emotive, and 
social content, which often served to position brain research as a domain 
from which the self was excluded due to want of knowledge, interest, or per-
sonal relevance.
The centrality of anchoring and objectification highlights the extent to 
which public reception of unfamiliar scientific concepts is premised on 
already-existing features of social and subjective realities. In particular, these 
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data suggest that public engagement with neuroscience is shaped by two 
parameters: the position the wider institution of science holds in contempo-
rary society and the role of dys-appearance in embodied experience.
The Position of Science in Contemporary Society
In these interviews, established repertoires of relating to “science” in general 
drove spontaneous responses toward “brain research” in particular. Most par-
ticipants strongly identified as “not scientific,” positioning themselves sharply 
outside the scientific world. The concept of brain research was overlaid on this 
self-science distinction, such that ascribing brain research to science simultane-
ously designated it as “not me.” The distancing of science was consolidated by 
alienating, stereotypical descriptions of its actors, who were embodied by icons 
such as white coats, strange instruments, and eccentric hairstyles (Haynes, 
2003; Petkova & Boyadjieva, 1994; Van Gorp, Rommes, & Emons, 2014). The 
analysis suggested that social estrangement from the scientific domain deterred 
people from engaging with its conceptual products. The research thus high-
lights the ”gatekeeping”role that identity plays in engagement with science 
(Breakwell, 2001; Joffe & Farr, 1996). In day-to-day life, active engagement in 
representational work hinges on the designation of a given phenomenon as 
relevant to the self; if it is immediately delegated to an alien social sphere, it 
does not find resonance in ordinary thought and conversation.
It is important to note that the disinclination to personally engage with 
knowledge designated “scientific” did not always reflect antipathy toward 
science. While some antagonism was evident, so too was idealization of sci-
ence and its actors. This accords with research on stereotype content, which 
shows that representations of out-groups often contain a mixture of pejora-
tive and complimentary content (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Both 
hostility and homage, however, were premised on a common positioning of 
science as socially “other.” Even those who lauded neuroscientists’ intellect 
and dedication showed little interest in acquainting themselves with the 
information they produced.
The data therefore challenge the postulate, often endorsed by SRT theo-
rists, that science occupies a uniquely significant position in contemporary 
common-sense (Farr, 1993; Moscovici, 1961/2008; Wagner, 2007). On the 
contrary, the designation of information as scientific may alienate large 
swathes of the population. As a result, even when scientific developments 
provoke media coverage as consistent as that of neuroscience, their percola-
tion into ordinary subjectivities does not inevitably ensue. This should not be 
cast as a necessarily dysfunctional outcome. Given the SRT premise that 
common sense is fundamentally oriented toward satisfying social, emotional, 
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and pragmatic imperatives, perhaps neuroscientific knowledge simply does 
not currently serve any compelling psychosocial functions. As personal and 
political landscapes change over time, so too might the pertinence of brain 
science to everyday lives.
The Role of Pathology in Mediating Engagement With Science
Though the data suggested that neuroscience as a whole has not pervaded ordi-
nary common sense, the analysis exposed one key vector of engagement with 
neuroscientific ideas: the experience of neuropathology. Previous research 
(e.g., Buchman et al., 2013; Singh, 2013a) implies that brain knowledge 
assumes greater significance among clinical than nonclinical populations: psy-
chiatric diagnosis may solicit explicit reflection on the brain’s operations. 
Participants in this study seemed to intuitively grasp this, anticipating that their 
ordinary inattention to the brain could be breached by experience of it “going 
wrong.” This, they felt, was the only context that would conceivably motivate 
engagement with neuroscientific information. Concordantly, the few individu-
als who divulged personal experience of psychiatric disorder were more aware 
of and emotionally invested in neuroscientific ideas.
The contingency of neuro awareness on pathology resonates strongly with 
Leder’s (1990) work on the interplay between bodily disappearance and dys-
appearance. According to Leder (1990), the differential attention afforded to 
the body’s normal and pathological functioning cultivates a devaluation of the 
relevant body part, because it is disproportionately loaded with negative con-
notations. This contextualizes the responses of those participants for whom the 
word brain immediately elicited associations of worry, difficulty, and threat. 
The importance of pathology for triggering reflection on one’s own brain also 
set the tone for conceptualizing the category of brain research, which was pre-
sumed to be a medical field whose primary function was to cure illness. This 
proposed effect of dys-appearance may have relevance beyond neuroscience, 
underpinning a wider medicalization of science in the public domain: previous 
research has identified medicine as paradigmatic in public conceptions of 
“what science is” (Bauer, 1998; Durant, Evans, & Thomas, 1992). Social rep-
resentations of science may be shaped by a phenomenological tendency that 
weights conceptions of the body toward pathology and dysfunction.
The concept of bodily disappearance may also help account for the disjunction 
between the regularity of media coverage of neuroscience and its remoteness to 
this lay sample. Leder (1990) positions bodily disappearance as purposive rather 
than incidental, suggesting that it is necessary for the optimal functioning of the 
body (because it allows attention to focus on the external world). This raises the 
interesting proposition that disengagement from neuroscientific content may be 
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phenomenologically functional or motivated. If the phenomenological system 
prefers to remain oblivious to the moment-by-moment operations of the body, 
scientific schematisations of one’s bodily processes may be expressly avoided. 
Indeed, some interviewees articulated a sense of discomfort in directly contem-
plating their brain, experiencing this as cognitively or existentially jarring. 
Accustomed to the brain’s usual invisibility, people were uneasy with the notion of 
it being scientifically exposed and manipulated, describing this as violation or 
intrusion. Although neuroscience findings can circulate within cultural artifacts 
such as the media, they may experience difficulty in penetrating lay consciousness 
if their exposure of the brain clashes with—and disrupts the smooth functioning 
of—the embodied experience.
The research therefore suggests that representing a scientific topic does 
not solely involve digesting the information provided by outside sources such 
as the media. When the topic relates to human biology, one’s own bodily 
experience can be a further font of knowledge, shaping the extent to which 
people engage with science, the conditions under which they do so, and the 
conceptual and affective content of the ensuing representations. This offers a 
potentially fruitful new direction for SRT, which has thus far afforded mini-
mal attention to the embodied nature of knowledge.3 The works of phenom-
enological philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty, Husserl, and Sartre, as well 
as recent research in embodied cognition (Meier, Schnall, Schwarz, & Bargh, 
2012), suggest that bodily states selectively evoke particular conceptual and 
affective content. A comprehensive etiology of representations should there-
fore consider whether they are shaped by the derivatives of corporeal experi-
ence, as well as social communication.
Limitations and Future Directions
This research represents the most comprehensive study heretofore pub-
lished of how people with no preidentified investment in brain research 
engage with neuroscientific ideas. However, the picture it gives is not 
exhaustive, and many avenues for further research remain. In particular, 
while the qualitative design facilitated a rich and detailed insight into the 
processes by which participants made sense of brain research, it is impos-
sible to gauge the extent to which the sentiments of these 48 individuals are 
typical of the wider population. For instance, while efforts were made to 
stratify the sample on a range of sociodemographic variables, all partici-
pants were Britons living in London. Given that previous research has 
detected cross-cultural differences in engagement with neuroscientific 
knowledge (Singh, 2013b), similar studies in other cultural contexts could 
yield interesting divergences. As an additional prospect for future research, 
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the interview data could inform the development of surveys administered to 
wider, more representative samples.
A further point to consider relates to the influence of the specific interview 
technique adopted on the data elicited. While the open nature of the GEM inter-
view strategy ensures that the responses provided are spontaneous and partici-
pant-led, the lack of direction can result in diffuse, heterogeneous data. Though 
this befits an exploratory study, future research requiring more focused data 
may benefit from more direct questioning strategies or from soliciting responses 
to specific examples of neuroscientific concepts or imagery.
Conclusion
Looking to the future, it is possible that neuroscience will continue to expand its 
position in the public sphere, increasingly invoked by the media, policy makers, 
and cultural commentators. However, heightened public visibility should not be 
automatically equated with heightened personal engagement. The current 
research proffers the possibility of public receptivity to those aspects of neuro-
scientific knowledge that pertain to clinical phenomena. In this study, psychiat-
ric disorders were clearly defined as neurobiological in nature, and neurological 
degeneration (particularly dementia) constituted an object of dread in the cul-
tural imaginary. However, the research suggests that beyond contexts of pathol-
ogy, the diffusion of neuroscientific ideas into ordinary conceptual registers 
faces several hurdles. Identity dynamics that detach the self from the scientific 
domain may prompt disengagement from neuroscientific information, which is 
positioned beyond the perimeter of one’s own knowledge, interest, and ability. 
In addition, features of human embodiment mean that in the absence of pathol-
ogy, the brain recedes from conscious awareness; indeed, people may actively 
resist contemplating their own bodily interior. As a result, neuroscientific knowl-
edge may remain remote from everyday life. A “neuro society” may be more 
theoretical fantasy than lived reality.
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Notes
1. This was chosen as the prompt term instead of neuroscience because pilot 
research indicated that neuroscience is not a universally familiar word. In 
discussing the analysis in this article, the authors use neuroscience and brain 
research interchangeably.
2. As the open-ended design set few constraints on conversational topics, interviews 
often slipped between discussion of brain research and discussion of the brain. The 
analysis reflects this: as these two foci are intrinsically interconnected in the data, 
attempting to analytically decouple them would misrepresent the data collected.
3. While there is a substantial body of SRT research exploring how sociocultural 
processes guide interpretations of one’s own and others’ bodies (e.g., Herzlich, 
1973; Joffe & Staerklé, 2007; Jovchelovitch & Gervais, 1999), little SRT work 
has considered the reverse direction of the body-society relationship—that is, 
how bodily experience constitutes social psychological life. For exceptions, see 
the work of Denise Jodelet (1984, 1993).
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